|
 Building
a home philosophy library
Lyn
May and Steve Deery
The
fourteenth in a series of articles advising on how to build your
own home philosophy library.
No.
14 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History
Hilary
Putnam, in Reason, Truth and History, argues for a middle
ground between idealism and realism - internal realism. Baldly stated,
this is the view that although we can talk about a reality independent
of us, this is always within a rational framework of beliefs and
concepts: there is no God's Eye view of the world.
Putnam
begins by considering the sceptical question of how we know we are
not brains in a vat. He argues that this position is self-refuting;
if we really think we are brains in a vat this means we aren't,
as "meanings just aren't in the head". Reality cannot
be grounded solely in the mind.
Next
he considers the relationship between concepts and the external
world. Putnam argues there is no magical, unique, mapping of terms
to objects. If there is no unique mapping then we cannot hold a
correspondence theory of truth. Both arguments undermine any attempt
to ground reference, either in the external world or the mind, thereby
supporting Putnam's internal realism.
The
remainder of Reason, Truth and History elaborates on the
theme of internal realism within the context of various philosophical
issues. Putnam shows how metaphysics need not be an abstract game,
but can be brought to bear on such diverse issues as moral value
and the status of scientific theories. This not an easy book to
get to grips with, but this due to the serious analysis of the subject
matter rather than the style of presentation.
Reason,
Truth and History by Hilary Putnam (Cambridge
University Press ) £17.75 /$24.95
A
new book will be featured mid-February 2002.
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