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Introducing philosophy of religionParadoxes

The first in Francis Moorcroft's series looking at some the classic philosophical paradoxes.

No. 1 The Paradox of the Liar

Francis Moorcroft

Suppose someone said to you

What I am now saying is a lie.

Is what they said true or false? If what they said was true, then they are telling a lie so it is false; on the other hand, if it is false then it isn't a lie and so must be true!

This paradox known as the Paradox of the Liar is usually attributed to Epimenides - although it was actually devised by Eubilides. Epimenides, who was a Cretan, was supposed to have said

All Cretans are liars.

The problem is: Is he telling the truth or not. It seems that if the sentence is true, then it is false. But if it is false, then it is true.

A tempting way out is to suppose that the problem is to do with the notion of self-reference, that Epimenides was referring to himself when he said 'All Cretans are liars'. After all, one favourite version of the paradox is

This sentence is false

and a clearer case of self-reference couldn't be given, as the 'this' of the sentence refers to the sentence itself.

Such a solution would, however, be premature. Consider the following pair of sentences

The following sentence is true.

The preceding sentence is false.

Neither of these sentences refers to itself, and yet the same paradox is generated: if the first sentence is true then it is false - but if it is false then it is true. So the problem can't be about self-reference.

Perhaps by now you may be thinking that the problem is that such utterances as Epimenides' and the other versions given above are not true or false but meaningless, that they may, on the surface, appear to make sense but really have no more meaning than the nonsense verse of Lewis Carroll. This solution may also be attractive but consider the following case. You are walking down the street and you find a card on the pavement which says

The sentence on the other side of this card is true.

When you turn over the card, the other side reads

The sentence on the other side of this card is false.

The problem is that if the first sentence was meaningless then how did you know that you should turn over the card and read the other side...

 

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The paradoxes series will be updated at the beginning of August 2001

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