|
 Provocations
Michael
LaBossiere
Number
Four: The Unbreakable Skeptic
Skepticism,
in general, is the philosophic position that we do not have knowledge.
There are various types of skepticism that are defined primarily
by the extent of the doubt. For example, a very modest skeptic might
doubt we can know whether metaphysical claims are true or not; while
the most extreme skeptic would doubt everything-even her own existence.
It is surprisingly easy to argue for skepticism and there are two
arguments that seem effective against all attempts to argue that
we do have knowledge.
The
first argument is as follows. It is generally accepted that for
a belief to count as knowledge it must be both true and adequately
justified. Regardless of what standard of justification is used
there will arise the question of what justifies the acceptance of
that standard. If an attempt is made to justify that standard, then
the question merely arises again for that attempt at justification.
If no attempt is made to justify the standard, then there is no
reason to accept the standard. Either way, there will be no grounds
for accepting the standard and it will have to be concluded that
the skeptic is right.
The
enemy of the skeptic can counter by asserting that the standard
is self-justifying or not in need of justification. Of course, this
creates a bit of a problem: different people claim different self-justifying
standards and use these to justify beliefs. Not surprisingly, these
beliefs sometimes contradict one another. So, unless we are willing
to accept contradictions, at least one of these standards must be
flawed. To pick between them, we would need some sort of standard,
which takes us back into the original problem. If there is no standard
to appeal to, we would have no grounds to pick between them, so
all would be equally valid and we would have to accept contradictions.
This would, of course, place us in a pickle that might be worse
than skepticism.
The
second argument is as follows: for every reasonable argument given
in support of the view that we have knowledge via some means there
is a reasonable counter-argument that casts unbreakable doubt on
that means. Ironically, these skeptical arguments can be based on
the same sort of evidence used in the original argument. As an example,
consider the senses. Suppose it is argued that we do know things
via our senses because they are to be trusted-except under conditions
in which we have reason to doubt them (such as when one has knocked
back a few too many pints of beer). The skeptic can easily counter
by the following argument: given that our senses are not infallible,
how can it be determined when they are working properly and when
they are not? Obviously, we cannot rely on our senses to answer
this question-for they are what are in doubt. So, we need some new
source of knowledge so we can know that our senses are to be trusted.
But, of course, this alleged new source of knowledge can be countered
as well.
The
enemy of the skeptic could claim the existence of an infallible
source of knowledge that is invulnerable to the gnawing teeth of
skeptical doubt. Of course, not even this can stop the skeptic-there
still arises the question of the means by which it can be determined
that this source is infallible. If it is claimed that its infallibility
is self-evident, a problem similar to the one raised above for self-justifying
standards occurs-how do we chose among the various allegedly self-evidently
infallible sources of knowledge?
While
there seems to be no effective way to beat the arguments for extreme
skepticism, it is common for thinkers to simply reject such skepticism
on pragmatic grounds, evolutionary grounds, or to simply assert
that we do know things. However, these attempts do not seem to succeed.
Clearly,
simply asserting that we do know things begs the question for it
simply assumes the skeptic is wrong without actually addressing
the arguments. Of course, it has been contended by philosophers
like Chisholm that it is perfectly acceptable to assume we know
things and thus "break" the skeptic.
Asserting
that evolution, via natural selection, has produced beings that
do have knowledge has a certain appeal. After all, an appeal to
evolution seems to be an accepted (perhaps even orthodox) solution
to a broad range of problems these days. However, this appeal merely
pushes back the problem-in virtue of what is our belief in evolution
justified? If we appeal to evolution again, we will have run in
a circle. If we appeal to something else, then the initial appeal
to evolution has been rejected. Either way, an appeal to evolution
is no answer.
The
pragmatic answer also has a certain appeal-assuming we know things
seems to have practical value. Of course, the question still arises-in
virtue of what is the belief in pragmatism justified? Obviously,
it cannot be justified on pragmatic grounds and, if we appeal to
something else, then the appeal to pragmatism has been abandoned.
Thus
it would seem that the only way to "break" the skeptical
arguments is to simply assume they are ineffective. But, there does
not seem to be very much sport in that.
Provocations
will next be updated early December 2002
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