Provocations

Michael LaBossiere

Number Six: Fraud, Science and Ethics

While science is burdened by the stereotype of the mad scientist who threatens humanity it also enjoys the stereotype that presents the scientist as the objective and dispassionate seeker and conveyer of truth. While it is fortunate that the first stereotype rarely holds true, recent events have shown that the second one often fails to hold as well.

In the summer of 2002, two physicists were publicly accused of committing fraud in their research. Jan Hendrik Schon, formerly of Bell Laboratories, was the main author of several impressive papers that suggested a new means of creating transistors. Unfortunately, attempts to reproduce his results failed and investigators noticed that he had apparently altered his data. The second physicist, Victor Ninov, asserted in 1999 that he and his fellow researchers had found the nuclei of elements 116 and 118. However, other researchers were unable to verify his findings and he was eventually dismissed from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

These problems are not unique to physics. As Nicholas H. Steneck of the University of Michigan notes in the November 2002 issue of Scientific American, biologists had similar problems in the 1980s. Biologists of that time claimed that the existing system worked at uncovering fraud, but they were mistaken. Steneck implies that the same might be true of physicists.

One of the responses to the problems that arose in biology was the creation of guidelines indicating what constituted responsible behavior - in other words, ethics for research. The effectiveness of such guidelines would depend, in part, on the willingness of the researchers to abide by such moral restrictions.

While such guidelines might be useful, it seems obvious that a researcher should not need guidelines to tell her that committing research fraud is both unprofessional and immoral. Thus, such behavior does not seem to stem from ignorance but from a lack of willingness to do what is right.

There are numerous reasons why researchers might elect to engage in such apparently immoral behavior. First, there is the pragmatic reason - the field of science is extremely competitive. There are only so many grants, choice positions and Nobel Prizes to go around. It is thus no surprise that this "combat of wits", as Hobbes would put it, leads to such behavior. After all, as Glaucon argued in the Republic all organisms are motivated by a desire for "undue gain" and if anyone can gain an advantage by unjust behavior he would be a fool not to do so. Second, modern science itself has a tendency to undercut morality. This is put best by Richard Dawkins who said "the universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference." Assuming that this characterizes the scientific view of the universe, it would be odd to expect scientists to regard morality in general and moral guidelines in particular as having any foundation. One might as well expect them to believe in phlogiston.

But perhaps morality can be made scientific. Various thinkers, including Dawkins, have claimed that morality is a product of natural selection. Put very crudely, morality is an evolutionary strategy and successful moralities are those that enable genes to be passed on. On this view there is nothing metaphysical about morality - it is grounded in the cold, hard and pitiless reality of biology and survival. Thus, it might be contended, here is a morality scientists can accept. Problem solved, or so it seems.

Suppose a scientist realizes she has a chance to commit fraud that will potentially be of great benefit to her career. As a scientist, she realizes that her morality, just like her opposable thumb, has been a product of natural selection. She also realizes that morality, like her opposable thumb, has probably helped contribute to human survival (and thus the perpetuation of certain genes). She will almost certainly realize that none of this gives her a reason not to commit fraud. She might even consider the possibility that those who cling to morality will go the way of the large dinosaurs - successful once, but no longer so in a new age in which morality is no longer a viable strategy.

What then, can be done? To charge the scientist with "immorality" simply amounts to accusing her of not following a particular evolutionary strategy. She might as well be taken to task for deciding not to use her opposable thumbs. Fortunately, there is a classic method to fall back on, namely the "morality" advocated by Glaucon in the Republic and later by Thomas Hobbes. While each scientist might wish to get away with fraud, they do not want others to get away with it. Because, of course, if fraud were rampant the system would collapse and no one would be able to reap any plum positions or Nobel Prizes. Thus, they can make agreements not to commit fraud and can solemnly swear to punish those who decide to violate these agreements, which they regard as just. Of course, there is still that apparently eternally lingering problem of how to motivate those who think they can avoid detection or punishment…but I'm sure the scientists will come up with an answer to that.

Michael LaBossiere can be contacted here

Click here to return to the Philosophy Café

Provocations will next be updated early February 2003

Join Our Café mailing list

To receive *very* short messages, letting you know when the Café has been updated, just fill in your email address below - and press submit.

[If you wish to unsubscribe from the mailing list, simply fill in your subscriber email address, select "Unsubscribe", and press Submit.]

Previous Provocations

1. Evolution, Analogy and Complexity
2. Biomimicry
3. Lies - the best medicine?
4. The Unbreakable Skeptic
5. The Case for Nanoweapons