|
 Introducing
the philosophy of religion
The
third in Roy Jackson's series looking at some of the classic problems
in the philosophy of religion.
No.
3 God
- A Necessary Being?
In
the the second chapter of the Proslogion (Discourse,
1077), St Anselm, a well-regarded philosopher and theologian, presented
the original statement of what in the 18th century became
known as the ontological argument for the existence of God. However,
Anselm himself never referred to it by that title and, it might
be suggested, was not really attempting to present a coherent argument
in the first place.
Unlike
the other arguments we have looked at - so called a posteriori
arguments - this one is a priori. A posteriori knowledge
is the most common form of knowledge we possess. As an example,
my knowledge that Hitler was appointed Chancellor in 1933, or my
knowledge that sunflowers have yellow petals. This form of knowledge
can be verified (or, indeed, falsified) by experience (that is,
through observation, looking up the information in a reliable reference
book, past experience, etc.). However, it may be argued that not
all of our knowledge comes from experience alone. For example, the
fact that 2+2=4. Such mathematical formulations seem to be objective,
universal facts and, some would argue, can be determined prior to
experience.
Anselm's
Argument
`And
so, O Lord, since thou givest understanding to faith, give me to
understand - as far as thou knowest it to be good for me - that
thou dost exist, as we believe, and that thou art what we believe
thee to be. Now we believe that thou are a being than which none
greater can be conceived.'
(From Proslogion, Chapter 2)
The
important part of this quote is what Anselm meant by "that
thou are a being than which none greater can be conceived".
Two key words here need to be clearly defined. First of all, what
did he mean by `conceived' (some translations use the word `thought')?
Judging from the Proslogion, the primary meaning of this
word is synonymous with that which is logically possible. However,
the problem here is that it certainly seems possible to conceive
of God's nonexistence. As we will examine later, however, the conception
of the nonexistence of God is, in fact, logically impossible!
The
second key word is what he meant by `greater'. Although Anselm himself
does not define what he meant by this, it seems apparent that he
is not merely limiting himself to `goodness', but is using it in
the more all-encompassing manner that suggests God's omnipotence;
i.e. powerful, able, and so on. It is obvious that he did not mean
the greatest being that you or I can possibly think of, or conceive,
simply because we are limited in our conceptions. What Anselm meant
was the greatest being that it is logically possible for any conceiver
to conceive of. The very fact that Anselm meditates upon the property
of God as being `the greatest being' means that God must be greater
than the human conception of `greatness'.
Having
at least some idea of what Anselm meant by his terms, lets look
at the main points of the argument:
1.
There are two types of existence.
We
can conceive of things that exist in reality, but we can also conceive
of things that do not. This does not in itself prove they exist,
and therefore, we are not really comparing like with like. It's
rather like playing chess; you may be about to checkmate me but
I say that I have imagined, or conceived, that I have three queens
that have surrounded your king and, therefore, I win!
2.
That which exists in the mind could possibly exist in reality.
It
could be argued that Superman might, in fact, exist; if not exactly
how we conceive of him. After all, a man that flies through the
skies in leotards is not a logical impossibility (unlike a square
circle). The fact that we are able to conceive of a being that is
capable of performing acts that we, as mere mortals, are not, at
least points to its possibility, even if you are unable to understand
all of its attributes.
3.
Things that exist in reality are greater than those that exist in
the mind.
This
is a vital point in the argument. Remembering our definition of
`greater' as omnipotence, Anselm suggests that if you can conceive
of something greater in the mind and that there is a possibility
that it exists, then its existence would be greater (in terms of
more powerful, able, freer, and so on) than a figment of someone's
imagination. My imaginative chess pieces may be powerful in my mind,
but not much help unless they exist on the chess board.
4.
God only exists in the mind!
Anselm
obviously didn't believe this, but what he is doing is making use
of the reductio ad absurdum argument to show that if you
assume that God does not exist in reality you are making a logical
error. Why? If we accept the definition that God is `a being than
which none greater can be conceived,' and we also accept the argument
that a being that exists in reality is considerably greater (more
powerful) than one that exists in the mind, then God must
exist! God in reality is far greater than God in the mind. Therefore:
5.
God exists both in reality and in the mind.
Provided
we accept the possibility of `the greatest being', and that which
exists in reality is greater than that which exists in the mind,
then God, as the greatest being, cannot exist only in the mind.
Refutations
1.Gaunilo
It
is worth looking at two objections that the monk Gaunilo raises
in response to Proslogion:
(i)
An idea in the mind does not require its existence.
I
can imagine all sorts of things: Santa Claus, unicorns, etc. Having
the notion of a thing is, however, not the same as the thing
itself. Yet this is what Anselm seems to believe; that the idea
of a thing is a lesser version of the thing in reality. Anselm is
inheriting a metaphysics of truth that owes some debt to St. Augustine;
that is, God is the Supreme Truth. Conceiving of God is, by definition
and logically speaking, conceiving of that which is true and Anselm
is making an association between truth and reality. For example,
the definition of Santa Claus is not `the Supreme Truth' nor, for
that matter, is he `the greatest being'; he is a jolly fat man who
comes down chimneys with presents. To have a notion of Santa Claus
you do not have to accept that he exists in reality because his
definition doesn't require it.
(ii)
By Anselm's logic we can prove the existence of anything.
This
is Gaunilo's most famous retort. He used the example of an island:
We
can conceive of a perfect island
A
perfect island must be more perfect in reality than in the mind
Therefore,
a perfect island exists.
Gaunilo
was following the same logical structure as Anselm to show that
all manner of things can exist. Anselm replied to this in his short
work, Reply to Gaunilo . His response depends on understanding
two important concepts:
(a)
Logically necessary existence
Anselm
would simply say that `God is different from an island'. But in
what way? God is the greatest of all things; all-powerful. Such
a being, again by definition, cannot be reliant upon any
other being. As Leibniz said, `There must exist some one Being of
metaphysical necessity, that is, to whose essence existence belongs.'
This is the classical definition of God; not created by anything
else and therefore not dependent upon anything else; yet a necessary
being for other beings to exist.
(b)
Contingent existence
An
island, however, is not, by definition, the greatest of all beings.
It is contingent in the sense that is dependent for its existence
on - if nothing else - God. Therefore, we may attempt to conceive
of the greatest, or most perfect, island but we are still then able
to conceive of something even greater than that! Seemingly,
the only way you can get out of this argument is by defining an
island as omnipotent! Here, again, Anselm is showing that his definition
of `greatness' is synonymous with omnipotent; not with `most beautiful
mountains' or `tallest' etc.
2.
Kant
Kant
argued that using the term `exists' as if it has some real value
is a mistake: the word `exists' is not a `real predicate'.
For example, the sentence "that car is fast" has two elements:
the subject (`car') and a predicate (`fast'). The purpose of the
predicate in this case is to provide some extra _ and useful _ information
about the car and is, therefore, a real predicate. You could say
"that car is flimflar" in which `flimflar' is a logical
predicate, but not a real one because it tells you absolutely
nothing about the car itself.
So,
for Anselm to talk about God in terms of `existence' is telling
us nothing whatsoever about God. Anselm was, after all, attempting
to show that, through a priori reasoning, we can learn something
about the nature of God.
At
first, Kant does appear to have a strong argument; in cases where
it is already presupposed that something exists. For example, describing
my car to you will tell you much about my car (`dirty, old, rusting,
noisy'), but to then add `it exists' seems a nonsensical remark.
But is `existence' always simply a logical predicate? Can it not
sometimes be real in the sense it could tell us something that would
change our idea of it? If I was to describe Superman to you and
then add, `and he exists', then surely I would be providing you
with information that is useful?
3.
Swinburne
A
curious criticism comes from Richard Swinburne who attacks the very
notion of requiring a logical argument to prove the existence of
God. To require a truth of logic to prove God's existence makes
God dependent upon that logic and, therefore, God is no longer an
independent being! Swinburne, here, is not denying the existence
of God, but stating that God as an omnipotent, necessary being would
contradict the dependence upon a logically necessary principle for
its existence. But it does not require much working out to see that
Swinburne is confusing `the existence of God' with `proving
the existence of God'. God's existence does not depend on the argument;
only the proof does. If I somehow fail to prove that my car exists
(for example, some misled individual does me the favour of stealing
it) then it does not follow that it's existence is dependent upon
that proof.
Conclusion
In
terms of logic, the argument is very clever, although many would
say it is little more than a trick with language. As with all logical
argument you have to have a solid premise and, as with the other
arguments for the existence of God, to define God as `greater than'
in the sense of omnipotent, one, creator, necessary, and so on does
mean that we are using religious language. When we are dealing with
language we are inevitably sucked into the world of meaning and
value. Descartes, for example, conceived of God as the perfect being
and, as existence is more perfect than nonexistence, then He exists;
existence is God's essence in the same way the essence of
a triangle is `three-sided plane figure'. But where does this conception
of God come from? What of religious believers outside of the theistic
realm?
Suggested
Reading
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Brian Davies,
(Oxford University Press, 1993), Ch. 4
The Puzzle of God, Peter Vardy (Fount, 1995), Chapter 9.
God, Reason and Theistic Proofs, Stephen T Davies (Edinburgh
University Press, 1997), Ch. 2
The Existence of God, ed. John Hick (Macmillan, 1964), Chapter
1 contains the original writings of Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz,
Kant, etc.
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Part
4 of Introducing the Philosophy of Religion will appear on March
1st 2001
Previous
articles in the series
1.
2.
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