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Battleground
God FAQ
FAQ
written 30/04/02
[Note
this is the first version, and it was written under considerable
time pressure, so apologies if it is a bit rough around the edges
or you find something silly]
Okay,
this is where we try to deflect some of the email that we get sent
about this game. I'm afraid that we will not be able to get involved
in debates about the various issues here (because it'd involve way
too much time), but if you spot any blindingly obvious or daft logical
errors (we've made them before and no doubt will again!), . [But really, I mean "very obvious, you
must have been asleep when you wrote that", kind of stuff!]
1.
What are you going on about the Loch Ness monster for, surely
you're just confused?
The
Loch Ness Monster/atheism comparison has to do with the oft heard
claim of theists that atheism must be a faith because there isn't
any evidence or compelling argument for the non-existence of God.
It's the "you can't prove God doesn't exist, so believing that
she doesn't is not rational" argument.
So
question 14 is: As long as there are no compelling arguments
or evidence that show that God does not exist, atheism is a matter
of faith, not rationality.
This
amounts to the following claim: In the absence of argument or evidence
to show that God doesn't exist, atheism is faith.
Or,
more formally (but, before I'm jumped on, not formal in the "formal
logic" sense):
If
there is no evidence for not-P, then belief in not-P is faith (where
P is God's existence).
So
what's this got to do with the Loch Ness monster? Well, question
10 is:
If,
despite years of trying, no strong evidence or argument has been
presented to show that there is a Loch Ness monster, it is rational
to believe that such a monster does not exist.
At
first sight, this is a different kind of question. It's asking about
evidence for the existence of something, not the non-existence of
something.
But,
of course, that's the whole point.
If
you answer "True" to question 10, then you're committed
to the view that evidence for the non-existence of Nessie
is not required in order to come to the conclusion that the
monster does not exist; that is, evidence of absence is not
required - rather, in certain circumstances, absence of evidence
is enough to conclude that Nessie does not exist. In other words,
the fact that there are no compelling arguments or evidence
to show that Nessie does not exist (and now we have equivalence
with question 14) is not, in and of itself, sufficient to
rule out, in principle, a justified belief in Nessie's non-existence.
So
returning to question 14 - if you answer "True" to question
10, to remain consistent you have to answer false to question 14.
The point is that there are circumstances where it might be rational
to believe in the non-existence of God, even in the absence of compelling
arguments or evidence to show that God does not exist. These circumstances
might include: where science uncovers all the secrets of the universe,
understanding its origins and final destiny; where we find out (positively)
that our existence and the universe's is the product of some entity
that we wouldn't want to call God (which, of course, is not itself
positive evidence for the non-existence of God).
2.
That's all very well, you say, but the Loch Ness monster isn't
the same kind of thing as God - and, in principle, God is the kind
of entity that might forever be beyond our knowledge.
This
response gets caught in a pincer movement. But the argument is quite
involved - and it would be disingenuous to claim that our rejoinder
is decisive!
The
essence of the objection is this: Nessie is a physical entity, in
a confined space, so the presence or absence of Nessie is verifiable
in a way that God's is not.
At
first sight, this seems reasonable, although some people will feel
slightly uneasy at the idea that it is possible to make definitive
claims about an entity which might not exist.
So
what's the problem?
Well,
imagine yourself confronted by a Nessie non-existence sceptic.
They're part of some Nessie worshipping cult (and remember that
many people do believe truly bizarre things, so this is not entirely
gratuitous)! And they say to you: "Sure, Nessie is a physical
entity, but it has the rather extraordinary (indeed unique - and
possibily mystical) ability to remain forever beyond detection."
How
does one respond? Well, it is extremely difficult - indeed it is
probably impossible - to disprove this proposition. But equally,
most people would consider it absurd to continue to believe in Nessie,
if, for example, the whole of Loch Ness was drained of water, and
at the bottom one found no Nessie, but a large Nessie shaped submersible.
If
this is right (we're correctly reporting how most people would react),
it means that most people don't require the absolute, beyond all
possibility, refutation of a non-existence sceptic's challenge,
even where this challenge involves a mystical, beyond human knowledge,
component, in order to discount it, and to conclude that
belief in the non-existence of an entity is rational.
What's
this got to do with God? Well, it has to do with God, because the
can't prove the non-existence of God move, in certain circumstances,
is analogous to the Nessie non-existence sceptic move. It
is so, in those circumstances mentioned above (whilst discussing
objection 1): where science uncovers all the secrets of the universe,
understanding its origins and final destiny; where we find out (positively)
that our existence and the universe's is the product of some entity
that we wouldn't want to call God, etc.
In
other words, it is analogous to the Nessie non-existence sceptic
move, in those circumstances where we don't require further explanations
of the universe and our place in it.
Okay,
so many of you are not going to be convinced. You'll say, but God
is a different kind of thing from Nessie. Well, to that,
the Nessie non-existence sceptic will reply - "No, she's
not; not in the important sense that absence of evidence is never
enough to justify belief in the monster's non-existence"; and
the atheist will reply, "Hey, you didn't allow the Nessie non-existence
sceptic to make that move, so how come you get to make it"?
And this is the pincer movement. Sure, it is always possible to
claim that God is, in principle, and in all circumstances, forever
opaque to us - but you can't do this and deny the Nessie non-existence
sceptic the same move. Or, to put it another way, you can claim
that it is possible to make reasonable assumptions about Nessie's
non-existence, but only if you concede that there might be circumstances
where one can do the same about God's non-existence.
The
final point to mention is that it is of no consequence that
we might not yet be at the point where it is possible to make the
reasonable assumption that lack of evidence for God's existence
justifies atheism. The conditional in the question was not qualified
(i.e., it didn't say something like: "Given the state of knowledge
about the universe today, as long as there are no compelling...).
3.
Evolutionary theory has been proved certainly and irrevocably.
This
one catches the atheists, and boy, they don't like it. The problem
emerges (it's a bullet) if one accepts that evolutionary theory
is true, but want certain and irrevocable proof for God before
accepting God's existence.
Well,
sorry guys, you don't get certain and irrevocable
proof in science - and if you think that you do, then it is you
that doesn't understand how science works, not us! The point is,
of course, that irrevocable certainty is not required before it
is reasonable to accept scientific propositions as being true (i.e.,
as being facts). Here's Stephen Jay Gould on this matter:
"In
science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that
it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.' I suppose
that apples might start to rise tomorrow, but the possibility
does not merit equal time in physics classrooms."
4.
God is the basis of morality, but he doesn't choose morality.
This
is an objection to the contradiction that arises when people claim
that God is the basis of all morality, but that she can't make good
bad, and bad good. The objection is simply that God has an immutable
nature, morality is a reflection of her nature, but because she
can't change her nature, she can't change morality.
This
works! Except that there is a complicated interplay between notions
of immutability and omnipotence. Where someone has also answered
"True" to the proposition that God is omnipotent it is
a lot less clear that this way of escaping the contradiction is
open to them. There are a variety of problems, which we won't go
into, but here's a flavour of two:
a)
Can a being be said to be omnipotent if it doesn't have the power
to change its own nature? [The answer is likely "yes"
because omnipotence isn't normally felt to require the ability to
do the logically impossible];
b)
If an immutable God is not able to change her own nature isn't she
less powerful than an entity that is de facto identical except
in being able to change her own nature but choosing not to?
5.
The test says I justify rape, but I didn't do any such thing!
This
is a reference to the Peter Sutcliffe question. But if you read
the question carefully, you'll see that it is not talking about
justifying the act of rape at all. It is talking about whether or
not Peter Sutcliffe was justified in believing that he was doing
the will of God. Mind you, having said that, I think we may
have been a bit provocative in the wording of one of our analyses!
Sorry!
6.
What a silly question about God being able to do contradictory
things!
Okay,
it's a fair cop. Many people will consider question 17, and the
hit that results if you answer "No" (having previously
claimed that God is omnipotent), to be a little unfair. Question
17 effectively asks whether God is able to do logically impossible
things (that's the point of it, even if some people want to argue
about whether there are such things as square circles, etc!). The
criticism is that omnipotence doesn't require that we're able to
do logically impossible things. We agree! But:
a)
Many people do not (you should see the email I get!);
b)
It isn't straightforwardly the case that propositions which are
contradictory or absurd are meaningless. If that is your claim,
then it needs to be grounded in a proper theory of meaning;
c)
There is always the thought that God might somehow not be constrained
by logic (which, of course, is a thought that theologians and philosophers
of religion have been keen to distance themselves from!);
7.
The bullet I've bitten isn't really a bullet.
See
our disclaimer at the beginning of the game. You may well be right.
8.
Religion isn't about the consistency of beliefs; religion embraces
paradox; religion is not about rationality; religion is about faith;
etc.
Yes,
we know! See our disclaimer at the beginning of the game (about
Kierkegaard). But it doesn't follow that there is no value in examining
a set of beliefs.
9.
How dare you call God "she".
Errr.
Sorry!
10.
There are a set of objections that have to do with things like
Plantinga's reformed epistemology, Tillich's thoughts about the
kind of existence God has, etc. Basically, it's the set of responses
that have come from professional theologians and philosophers of
religion.
To
which we reply, yes, yes, you're right! It is complicated,
but this is an online game!
11.
Ridiculous - the questions are all open to various interpretations.
This
is a bit of an odd objection. I mean, obviously, questions are open
to interpretation - and, indeed, we try very hard in this activity
not to force particular intepretations of God, omnipotence, etc.,
on people. [If there wasn't any room for interpretation, we'd get
complaints about forcing people down fixed routes; actually, come
to think of it, we do get complaints about this!]. It doesn't follow
that as a consequence, the activity has no relevance in terms of
finding out about the internal coherence of a set of beliefs. The
point, of course, is that you know how you interpreted
the question. Therefore, you're in a position to judge whether the
hits and bullets are fair given the way that you interpreted it.
Sometimes you'll conclude that they are - sometimes you'll conclude
that they aren't.
12.
This is just an exercise to trap theists.
Just
not true. Only three out of the 25 or so hits and bullets require
a "True" response to the proposition that "God exists".
13.
It's silly having a test with just "true" and "false"
answers.
This
is the internet, guys, and Battleground God is a computer program,
be reasonable! Also, did you know that a guy called Harold Garfinkel
developed a whole new approach to counselling based on "Yes/No"
answers. Kind of...
14.
Will you develop one which uses Modal Logic?
No!
15.
Is it possible that you've made obvious logical errors, missed
get outs, etc., in this test?
Yes,
of course it is. Part of the story here has to do with how it was
developed. Before it went live, the activity was beta-tested via
a variety of online forums (i.e., the link was posted, and discussion
ensued). Urban75 was one of them, for example. As a result of the
feedback we received, we made a number of changes (because some
stuff was just wrong). The problem with making changes is that there
can be unforeseen ramifications in terms of the logic of the thing.
Just a slight alteration in wording - or even a typo [e.g., throwing
in a not in a crucial place!] - can throw things out completely.
Most
of the complaints that we get are not about obvious logical
errors. Given that it has been played so many times, that suggests
that there may not be any (if we're lucky!). But, of course, even
obvious logical errors can be hard to spot (if that's not a contradiction
in terms!) because human beings have a tendency to think habitually.
So they may be lurking around in the game! If so - ooops!
©
Jeremy Stangroom, 2002
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